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SUICIDE AND ASSISTING SUICIDE: A
CRITIQUE OF LEGAL SANCTIONSt
by
H Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. * and Michele Malloy**
ECENT legislation and court opinions concerning the right to die
make an examination of the legal sanctions against suicide and
assisting suicide a timely topic. The right of an individual to take
his or her own life, alone or with assistance, is engendering increasing in-
terest. ' This Article discusses the purposes of the law with regard to suicide
and assisting suicide2 and the current state of that law in American juris-
t Ancestral versions of this Article have been read at the Hastings Center Workshop
on Death, Dying and Public Policy, Sarah Lawrence College, June 23, 1977; the Death and
Dying Research Group, Hastings Center, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, April 21, 1978;
the Kennedy Institute for Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1980;
and the Georgetown Law Center, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1981.
We are in debt to a great number of individuals for their helpful suggestions, comments,
and arguments concerning this Article. Though we have benefited from this interchange
with them, they can in no fashion be held responsible for the shortcomings of this Article.
These individuals include Darrell W. Amundsen, Jane L. Backlund, Daniel Callahan,
Alexander Capron, Eric Cassell, James F. Childress, S.G.M. Engelhardt, Mary Ann
Gardell, Eric T. Juengst, Theodore Leblang, Richard McCormick, Seymour Perlin, Robert
Plotkin, James Speer, Robert Stevenson, Lynn Thomas, Robert Veatch, and LeRoy Walters.
* B.A., Ph.D., University of Texas at Austin; M.D., Tulane University. Senior Re-
search Scholar, Kennedy Institute, Center for Bioethics, and Rosemary Kennedy Professor
of the Philosophy of Medicine, Georgetown University. Beginning January 1983, Professor,
Department of Medicine, and Member, Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues, Bay-
lor College of Medicine.
** B.A., St. Mary's College; M.Ed., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., University of
Houston. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. For literature concerning the right to die, see M. BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES ON SUI-
CIDE (1982); BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA (M. Kohl ed. 1975); R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF
STRANGERS (1979); EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH (A. Downing ed. 1969); LAW
REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. 28, EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE
AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT (1982); D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE (1974); ON THE
NATURE OF SUICIDE (E. Shneidman ed. 1969); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HAND-
BOOK (1981); SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (S. Wallace & A. Eser eds. 1981); SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (M. Battin & D. Mayo eds. 1980); SUICIDE: THEORY AND CLINICAL
ASPECTS (L. Hankoffed. 1979); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLU-
TION (1976); Beauchamp,,An Analysis of Hume's Essay "On Suicide", 30 REV. METAPHYSICS
73 (1976); Beauchamp & Davidson, The Definition of Euthanasia, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 294
(1979).
2. Assisting suicide as used here indicates one or more of the following acts: (1) pro-
viding another with the means to commit suicide, for example, purchasing a gun or poison
for a prospective suicide; or (2) encouraging another to commit suicide. Either form of
assistance involves passive assistance. Conversely, engaging in active facilitation of a sui-
cide, such as shooting others at their request, or putting poison into their mouths at their
request, is designated as active assistance of suicide. Assisting suicide does not include ac-
tive assistance of suicide. Situations involving nonintervention when another is committing
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dictions. Because recent legal reflections directly concerning suicide have
been overshadowed by other reflections concerning the right to refuse life-
saving treatment, 3 the latter is also explored insofar as it may illuminate
the issues of suicide and assisting suicide. This Article then addresses the
statutory and pre-1973 case law on assisting suicide in Texas as an aber-
rant but instructive example of current suicide law.4 In addition, the civil
and criminal liability of physicians in the context of aiding and abetting
suicide is discussed. Finally, legislative recommendations are advanced
with regard to suicide and assisting suicide.
Two primary arguments exist for the legalization of suicide and assisting
suicide. The first is based upon considerations of an ethical principle: the
state should not enforce purported duties to oneself, such as the purported
duty not to take one's own life, because this enforcement infringes upon a
fundamental moral right of self-determination. The second argument is
based upon consequences: no evidence exists that the decriminalization of
suicide or assisting suicide would have significant antisocial results. The
force behind these arguments is that society must respect an individual's
suicide are not included under the rubric of passive assistance. One should note, however,
that special fiduciary relationships, such as those between a patient and a physician, may
convert what in other circumstances would simply be nonintervention into abetting the su-
cide of another. For a discussion of the distinction between killing and simply letting one
die, the active-passive distinction in ethics, see infra note 105. Passive assistance and aiding
or abetting suicide comes within the Model Penal Code as aiding or soliciting suicide.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
3. See Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARV. L. REV. 331 (1904); Mikell, Is Sui-
cide Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1903); Parry-Jones, Criminal Law and Complicity in
Suicide and Attempted Suicide, 13 MED., Sci. & L. I10 (1973); Schwartz, Civil Liability for
Causing Suicide.- A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1971); Shulman,
Suicide and Suicide Prevention.- A LegalAnalysis, 54 A.B.A.J. 855 (1968); Comment, Crimi-
nalAspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Criminal Aspects]; Comment, Suicide-Criminal Aspects, 1 VILL. L. REV. 316
(1956). See also literature bearing on euthanasia and the law, much of which is helpful in
considering the issue of suicide: Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973);
Crofts & Sharp, Death with Dignity. The Physician's Civil Liability, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 86
(1975); Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 54 (1975); Silving, Euthanasia.- A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U.
PA. L. REV. 350 (1954); Thurman, Euthanasia.- The Physician's Liability, 10 PRAC. & PROC.
148 (1976); Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lfesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 860 (1965).
The literature concerning suicide to date is incomplete and misleading. For example, one
commentator reports Texas as having a law against attempted suicide, although he fails to
note that until 1973 Texas had no law against aiding and abetting suicide, much less at-
tempted suicide. Comment, CriminalAspects, supra, at 158-63. Also, some have seen a con-
flict between the Texas ruling in Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908)
(allowing provision of means to suicide as long as the suicide committed the last act), and
Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925) (forbidding person assisting from
performing last definitive act of introducing deadly agent to the suicide). Comment, Crimi-
nalAspects, supra, at 158-63. This Article argues that Sanders and Aven are not in conflict.
For a recent journalistic overview, see Podgers, 'Rational Suicide' Raises Patient Rights Is-
sues, 66 A.B.A.J. 1499 (1980). For an account of a recent assisted suicide, see D.
HUMPHREY, JEAN'S WAY (1978).
4. The discussion primarily focuses upon Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 68 S.W.
529 (1902), Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908), and TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974). See infra notes 80-110 and accompanying text.
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freedom, even to the point of allowing persons to engage in acts that might
be self-destructive or immoral, as long as this freedom does not directly
and significantly injure others.5 This Article, however, examines only the
rights of competent individuals to commit suicide or to be assisted in sui-
cide, not the withdrawal of care and protection from the incompetent. Our
focus is upon those individuals who wish to commit suicide, to be assisted
in committing suicide, or to assist another in committing suicide, individu-
als who could not be found incompetent on grounds other than simply
having such a desire. 6
I. LEGAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SUICIDE AND ASSISTING SUICIDE
A. The Purpose of the Law
Many reasons have been advanced for governmental regulation of indi-
vidual affairs. These grounds for intervention have generally been reflec-
tive of global questions concerning the nature of the law and its purposes.
Such rationales are arranged under three rubrics: (1) the paternalistic
view, by which the state is considered the guardian of the best interests of
its individual subjects; (2) the public welfare view, by which the state has
the right to interfere and intervene in the individual's affairs for the sake of
the public welfare and the ordering of society; and (3) the libertarian view,
by which the state should function only as a protective vehicle of individ-
ual freedom.
Examples of paternalism include legislation on victimless crimes, such
as drug abuse, gambling, consensual sexual relations, and suicide. Pater-
nalistic regulation is reasoned upon the premise that the state is charged
with protecting the individual from self-inflicted harm. Judicial examples
5. The point is that (1) if the community is not to be a vehicle for the enforcement of
the views of some on others, and (2) if there are wide-ranging views as to what constitutes a
good life, and (3) if no definitive, rational argument establishes one such view as proper,
then (4) one may only impose on others that fabric of social structure essential to the general
welfare and protection of society, and (5) one may only define welfare in the most general
terms, such as food and shelter, where welfare can also be refused. Nor may the state en-
force duties to oneself, for the notion of duties to oneself is metaphorical. If one has a duty
to oneself, then the self that has the right to the discharge of the duty can release the self that
has the duty. Because these are the same selves, duties to oneself cannot strictly bind.
Singer, On Duties to Oneself, 69 ETHICS 202, 202-04 (1959).
The state has an interest in protecting its citizens from the practices of individuals who
would injure those citizens. The state, however, ought not enforce duties to oneself, because
such duties fall outside the province of a secular state, unless the state arrogates to itself the
role of protecting God's interests and religious moral concerns, as does the British state.
Concern with enforcing duties to oneself in the absence of a religious context will have even
less of a basis for common agreement than within a religious tradition, for one might pre-
suppose some prior consent to the imposition of an orthodoxy in a community with an
established religion. But even then heterodox views as to proper personal goods and goals
will exist. An orthodoxy that includes duties to oneself will, as a result, lead to imposing one
view of proper personal goods on all, not simply requiring one to agree to abide by jointly
chosen goals for common projects.
6. See A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE (S. Perlin ed. 1975). For a discus-
sion of the difficulties in framing a notion of mental competency and for establishing reliable
tests for mental competency, see MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (B. Brody &
H. Engelhardt eds. 1980).
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of this position include court-ordered blood transfusions7 to members of
religious sects that proscribe this use of bloodA Such legislation and court
holdings are suspect when they impose upon competent, nonconsenting
individuals what others hold to be in those individuals' best interests.9 Ini-
tially, how one can determine the best interests of others is unclear. A
7. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965).
8. Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists are the two sects most commonly in-
volved in treatment refusal litigation. Jehovah's Witnesses have refused transfusions on the
basis of their reading of the passages in the Bible that forbid eating anything still with blood
in it. Jews have traditionally applied these passages to the proper slaughtering of animals
for food, not to transfusions. See Deuteronomy 12:22-23; Leviticus 19:26. Christian Scientists
have categorically rejected medical treatment and have instead relied upon prayer as a
means to preserve and restore health. F. Lord, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALING: ITS PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICES 23 (1888).
9. Various levels of and justifications for paternalism can be established. Strong pater-
nalism would allow intervention on behalf of the best interests of others, even against their
will. In such instances respect for freedom is not recognized as a condition for a moral
community. Justification for intervention may also be attempted in terms of implied con-
sent; individuals would want others to interfere on their behalf when they would endanger
their own interests. In these circumstances, paternalistic intervention would function as a
form of insurance policy. See Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64 (1972). Respect for
freedom, however, is likely to foreclose anything save weak paternalism, which would allow
temporary intervention in order to establish whether the individual involved is cognizant of
the actual state of affairs in which he is engaged and is competent to act. One could, how-
ever, interfere only if sufficient grounds exist to believe that the individual to be restrained
was incompetent or mistaken about crucial facts. However, respecting freedom includes
respecting the freedom to embrace the wrong information. A classical formulation justify-
ing temporary limited intervention is provided by John Stuart Mill:
Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If
either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge
which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him
of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real in-
fringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he
does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a cer-
tainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge
of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk; in this
case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement
or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty), he
ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented
from exposing himself to it.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 117 (C. Shields ed. 1956). Once warned, that is, if it is clear that the
individual understands the dangers involved, he may proceed even in circumstances when
danger is certain. Paternalism raises two cardinal issues: (1) respect for the freedom of indi-
viduals who may wish to act in particular ways whether or not others would hold such acts
to be in the individual's best interests; and (2) who ought to be the judge of the best interests
of another. Paternalistic interventions can be classified as:
A. Paternalismfor incompetents. In cases of individuals who have never been competent
or who, while competent, expressed no judgment as to how they should be cared for while
incompetent, others have no choice but to attempt to determine as best they can what would
be in the best interests of those incompetents. This form of paternalism is best exemplified
in parentalism, in which parents protect the best interests of their incompetent children.
B. Fiduciarypaternalism. In fiduciary paternalism a competent individual appoints an-
other to act on his behalf. A Jehovah's Witness, knowing that he may become incompetent,
might instruct another to act as his guardian to prevent all blood transfusions. Alternatively,
the fiduciary may be given the prerogative to use his own discretion.
(1) Explicit. Here a person gives to another the right to act as his guardian
at a specified time. Some forms of the patient-physician relationship may be
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judgment of another's best interests requires an ordering of the significance
of benefits and banes. This ordering, however, presupposes a particular
moral or evaluational sense, and is therefore irradicably subjective. For
example, how does one determine when it really is or is not in a particular
individual's best interests to live longer, when this judgment is dependent
upon an individual's assessment of the importance, significance, and goals
of his own life?
One should also note the difficulty of establishing the moral priority of
any particular ordering of goods and harms. How can one establish
whether it is worth a particular amount of suffering in order to achieve a
certain chance of cure for a particular cancer, for example, or whether it is
better simply to commit suicide and avoid further pain? Appealing to
moral intuitions will not help since any particular moral intuition can be
countered by a second and contrary moral intuition. Neither will an ap-
peal to a disinterested moral observer or group of rational contractors
of this sort; for example, "Doctor, you have my consent to decide what you
think to be the best form of treatment, should such-and-such happen."
(2) Implicit. Under certain circumstances holding that individuals have
impliedly agreed that others may act in their best interests may be justified,
although no explicit formal agreement was actually made.
(a) Short-term implicit intervention. Minor paternalistic interventions
are often justified on the following basis. A reasonable and prudent person
would not mind intervention if he is about to engage in a very dangerous
act, so that others can determine whether he is incompetent and whether he
wishes to have relevant information concerning the dangerousness of the
activity in which he is about to engage. Liberty is not significantly re-
stricted, because competent individuals could always decline further inter-
vention. With respect to suicide, one could at most justify under this rubric
a mandatory short period in which to evaluate the competence of a would-
be suicide in circumstances when reasonable grounds exist for questioning
competence. Special legislation would not be required. General provisions
for short-term, usually 72 hours, civil commitment for evaluation of the pu-
tatively mentally ill should suffice. For example, California's statute allows
72 hours of civil commitment for evaluation of individuals thought to be
mentally ill and of danger to themselves. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150
(West 1972 & Supp. 1982). Another provision allows for a 14-day commit-
ment to follow the 72-hour period, however, in a context involving an immi-
nent threat of taking one's own life. Id § 5260 (West 1972).
(b) Long term implicit intervention. Some commentators have argued
that citizens of a society have implicitly agreed to paternalistic interventions
as social insurance policies. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra. This argument must
be qualified if one takes the freedom of the individual seriously. Competent
individuals should be able to rebut such an implied presumption by stating
simply that they are not interested in insurance through mandatory pater-
nalistic interventions. Such social insurance policy justifications for inter-
vention also presume that one can generally determine what is in the best
interests of individuals without consulting those individuals. Individuals
have divergent views of their own best interests, however, and no acceptable
formula has been proffered for the determination of how the best interests
of individuals are to be characterized.
C. Best interestspaternalism. Those who support strong paternalism argue that it is more
important to secure for others what third parties know to be in their best interests than it is
to respect the free choice of those who are subjected to the paternalistic intervention.
For some recent discussions of paternalism, see Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. &




help. In order for an appeal to an intellectual construct of a disinterested
moral observer or a group of rational contractors to substantiate a judg-
ment that a particular ordering of benefits and banes is to be preferred, one
must assign such an observer or group of moral contractors a moral sense.
But how will one choose what moral sense to assign?10 The appeal to intu-
itions or hypothetical choice theories presupposes that which they are to
provide. Thus, the only moral order that one will be able to assign is that
which is presupposed in the very undertaking of resolving moral disputes
peaceably, that is, the mutual respect of freedom. One will be able to con-
demn unconsented-to force against the innocent (i.e., those who have not
used such force) and the breach of that moral fabric, which is created by
common consent, because such is presupposed in the very practice of ask-
ing ethical questions as an alternative to force. I I The very nature of moral
10. See R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979); J. MILL, UTILI-
TARIANISM (London 1863); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). These works fail, how-
ever, to secure a crucial premise in establishing the moral priority of any ordering of goods
and harms. They must first establish the moral priority of a particular moral sense or estab-
lish concrete ordering of the goods of life. This, however, would require an infinite regres-
sion to further hypothetical rational perspectives regarding what would be the rational
choice among competing moral senses enlisted in the choice among moral senses, and so on
forever. That is, one must enlist a higher order of moral sense to choose which moral sense
to affirm. But one will then need to presuppose a yet higher order of moral sense in order to
choose a second order of moral sense, the latter being necessary for the choice of the first
order of moral sense. Since attempts to discover the character of the good life fail, moral
worlds must be recognized as the creation of individuals disposed to choose in accord with a
particular moral sense. What is common to all moral worlds is, as this Article shall argue,
the common commitment to mutual respect of moral individuals. This is the only moral
absolute, the minimum condition for the very enterprise of ethical action as an alternative to
force. Any further moral principles are less basic and therefore more costly in terms of
involving a commitment to a particular moral vision. They would require embracing one
moral viewpoint while eschewing others. As an element of framing an actual moral world,
this can only be accomplished morally with the consent of the participants, the individuals
committed to the choice of that particular moral world. These choices are dependent upon
historical, sociological, economic, and psychological factors; they are as much explicable by
historians, sociologists, economists, and psychologists as they are by philosophers concerned
with the principles of ethics. See Engelhardt, Tracialus Aruis Bene Moriendi Vivendique:
Choosing Styles of Dying andLiving, in FRONTIERS IN MEDICAL ETHICS: APPLICATIONS IN A
MEDICAL SETTING (V. Abernethy ed. 1980).
11. Thus, despite the variety of moral senses, insofar as one wishes to resolve issues
peaceably, one presupposes a relative moral absolute. This presupposition discloses a neces-
sary condition for a major element of a person's life. The endeavor of resolving moral dis-
putes as disputes open to rational agreement, not as disputes resolvable in terms of superior
force, leads to the acceptance of respect of freedom as a necessary condition for moral con-
duct. This acceptance results even when no definitive rational grounds exist to resolve a
dispute and the dispute, instead, must be resolved by mutual agreement. The grounds for
the common agreement provide a common rationale, even if these grounds are not the con-
clusions of definitive rational moral argument. We are offering, in short, a Kantian recon-
struction of Robert Nozick's argument for freedom as a side constraint by recognizing that
mutual respect of freedom is the necessary condition for ethics as an alternative practice to
the use of force in resolving moral disputes. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTO-
PIA (1974). As the need to accept this constraint, and this construction of its foundation,
becomes clearer, the more it becomes clear that correct moral answers to moral problems are
not likely to be discovered. Instead, they will need to be created by moral agents. One will
have provided the grammar of moral discourse without providing its content. One will also
have provided the most easily justified understanding of ethics in that this understanding
does not require one to accept any particular value, even freedom, as the goal of life or the
1008 [Vol. 36
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uncertainty in pluralist secular societies shifts the core of the general fabric
of morality to respect for the rights of individuals to pursue their vision of
the good life with consenting others. The focus is then upon protecting the
unwilling from coercion and providing refusable welfare rights, rather
than supporting a particular view of the good life through governmental
regulation.
This conclusion leads to a special difficulty with paternalistic interven-
tions against unconsenting competent individuals: determining the cir-
cumstances under which an organized group of individuals, for example a
state, may override the wishes of a free individual in matters that primarily
concern that individual and his consenting collaborators. Insofar as one
holds that individuals are the origin of governmental authority, one will
not be able to recognize the government as having authority that individu-
als have not in fact conferred upon it. Claims of governmental authority
to forbid actions done in private, alone or with consenting collaborators,
should thus be viewed as suspect. This suspicion should undercut claims
that forbidding the suicide of competent individuals can be justified on the
basis of a right to impose upon those individuals what others would hold
to be in their best interests. Such a strong form of paternalism would thus
be undermined.
The public welfare rationale for intervention in individual affairs is
often espoused by the judiciary. An example is a court-ordered blood
transfusion, not for the sake of the ill person, but because a minor child
would become a ward of the state if the mother is allowed to die. 12 Courts
have used a compelling interest analysis to determine the extent of neces-
sary state intervention.13 In this approach the state is not portrayed as
acting in the best interest of its individual subject. Instead, the state pro-
tects the public from having its just interests violated by the acts of individ-
uals. 14 In a free society, however, arguing that individuals have assumed
responsibilities to which they have not in fact agreed, or which they have
summum bonum. It requires only that one be interested in ethics as offering a mode of
resolving moral disputes other than through force. Individuals may decide not to value
freedom highly and, for example, to abandon their future opportunities to act freely through
suicide. Those choices, including the choice not to value freedom, should be made in a
context free of coercion, in order to support morality as an alternative to force. Understand-
ings of the moral life, which more fully specify the ordering of goods, require arguments to
establish the authority of a particular moral sense. These arguments do not appear
sustainable.
12. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); see also Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S.
202 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting); Geary v. Geary, 251 U.S. 535 (1919) (discussing role of
state as parens patriae).
13. For a discussion of the compelling interest test, see generally Sherril v. Knight, 569
F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
14. State interests include not letting individuals die by refusing treatment if they will
leave dependent children whom society will have to support. This rule would need to be
applied consistently. Would it, for example, prevent parents from putting their children up
for adoption? The compelling interest of the state also includes a paternalistic concern for
the welfare of citizens, in addition to viewing them as subjects of the state. For example, one
might assert that the state has a compelling interest to preserve the life of its citizens, even of
noncitizens within its jurisdiction, not only because the state needs individuals for its pros-
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not contracted to discharge, is difficult. Individuals cannot be construed as
they are under British law as subjects of the Crown who do not possess a
prima facie right to the termination of their lives. Arguments for the puta-
tive state right to control the private lives of citizens are thus brought into
question when one views the state as the creation of free individuals, rather
than the creator of individual rights.
The third rationale for legal intervention into individual affairs is liber-
tarian. Under this rationale the individual, not the state, is considered the
supreme judge of his own best interests. The individual is held to have a
right to self-determination, free choice, and autonomy. A classic, though
imperfect, formulation of the libertarian view is found in John Stuart
Mill's contention that "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances,
the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.15 Mill's argument
is not that individuals have a basic right to self-determination. Rather,
they are the best judges of what constitutes their own happiness, or, in later
developments of this position, their own preferences. 16 This view allows
individuals to make their own choices, not because they have an independ-
ent right to do so, but because they are the best judges in matters concern-
ing themselves. A more fundamental basis for the individual's right of
self-determination is found in political theories that hold that all govern-
ment authority is derived from the consent of the governed who possess
natural or pregovernmental rights, only some of which they delegate to the
government. 17
Recognition of the right of self-determination is the condition for the
concept of a community not based on force. Such a community can be
termed an ethical community in that it is grounded on rationality and
peaceful manipulation rather than force. Force used to impose on others,
against their wishes, what one thinks is best for them is thus not allowed.
This view undergirds a peaceable accommodation to the fact that there is a
pluralism of moral beliefs: although one may not be able to agree about
what constitutes good life, or good death, one can agree to let each make
his own choices, as long as those choices do not involve direct and signifi-
cant violence against others.
Given this libertarian view of the state as affording the fabric of plural-
ism, a secular state exists not to enforce religious or moral laws unless
those rules are commonly agreed to be to its members' direct earthly bene-
perity, but because the state has an interest in enforcing what it believes to be the best
interests of those individuals.
15. J. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM AND ON LIBERTY 202 (M. Warnock ed.
1962).
16. For a helpful discussion of the preference interpretation of utilitarianism, see R.
SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 9 (1975).
17. The point is a libertarian one. Individuals have rights, including the right to self-
determination, so that governments are created by individuals for those individuals' joint
purposes. As a consequence, a state does not have legitimate powers over its citizens, except
as agreed to by the citizens beforehand, unless the state is protecting the innocent against
unconsented-to force.
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fit.' 8 Moreover, the presumption is generally made that individuals have
not agreed to restrict their rights to engage in actions primarily bearing
upon their own self-determination. Individuals should be seen as not hav-
ing delegated authority to the state to prevent them from making choices
primarily concerning themselves.19 Examples of legal self-determination
reflecting this libertarian view include Roe v. Wade.20 In Roe the United
States Supreme Court held that women have the freedom to engage a phy-
sician to terminate pregnancy in the first and second trimesters. 21 There
have as well been changes in the laws on sexual relations of consenting
adults.22
This Article defends the libertarian view with respect to legal sanctions
regarding suicide.23 The state exists to protect the individuals who consti-
18. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Recently, this view has gained even
greater ground in rulings forbidding, for example, prayer in public schools. See, e.g.,
Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
19. A contemporary defense of this view of the state and of the individual's right to
autonomous choice has been advanced by Robert Nozick. See R. NoziCK, supra note 11.
For a collection of articles analyzing Nozick's ideas, see Symposium.: Robert Nozick's Anar-
chy, State and Utopia, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1977).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. ld at 164.
22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). For a discussion of
the right of competent adults to consent to sexual acts in private and the role of the state as
an enforcer of morals, see P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). See also
Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law.- An Empirical Study of Enforcement
and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 643 (1966); Comment, The
Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDUAM L. REV. 553 (1976); Comment, Constitu-
tional Protection of Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults.- Another Look at Sod-
omy Statutes, 62 IowA L. REV. 568 (1976); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior.
The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581
(1967). For a recent court ruling supporting the right of competent, consenting adults to
engage in deviant sexual acts in private, see People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d
935, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980). The court's reasoning on Onofre, in distinguishing between
what may be morally or theologically objectionable and what may be forbidden by law in a
secular society, could be appropriately transferred to the issue of suicide. That is, our society
should allow individuals a general secular right to commit suicide, even though particular
moral communities may view suicides as acting immorally:
We express no view as to any theological, moral or psychological evaluation
of consensual sodomy. These are aspects of the issue on which informed,
competent authorities and individuals may and do differ. Contrary to the
view expressed by the dissent, although on occasion it does serve such ends, it
is not the function of the Penal Law in our governmental policy to provide
either a medium for the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforce-
ment of moral or theological values. Thus, it has been deemed irrelevant by
the United States Supreme Court that the purchase and use of contraceptives
by unmarried persons would arouse moral indignation among broad segments
of our community or that the viewing of pornographic materials even within
the privacy of one's home would not evoke general approbation. . . . The
community and its members are entirely free to employ theological teaching,
moral suasion, parental advice, psychological and psychiatric counseling and
other noncoercive means to condemn the practice of consensual sodomy. The
narrow question before us is whether the Federal Constitution permits the use
of the criminal law for that purpose.
415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3 (citations omitted).
23. We use libertarian not to indicate the viewpoints of a particular political party or of
particular libertarians, but rather to indicate the moral understanding that consent of the
governed is the basis of legitimate governmental authority. This approach leads to the co-
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tute it and to pursue their commonly chosen goals. As a consequence, the
state has no inherent moral right to proscribe victimless crimes such as
suicide and assisting suicide. The state must operate as an enterprise for
the realization of freedom insofar as that realization is to remain a moral
endeavor, not an instrument of force against innocent individuals. The
point here is a modest one. It requires recognizing only that, if definitive
rational arguments are not available, political frameworks can be based
either upon force or upon appeal to the respect of individual consent. The
latter may be stipulated as moral. This moral view is the necessary condi-
tion for the possibility of the practice of peaceably resolving disputes con-
cerning proper conduct. Insofar as one is asking an ethical question in
seeking a convincing justification for a line of conduct, one eschews the use
of unconsented-to force, though not force itself. For the state to force
upon its members an unconsented-to view of what constitutes good is to
violate the notion of the state as a moral enterprise, one based on mutually
agreed-to views of that good; unconsented-to force makes the state an in-
strument for some to control the lives and opinions of others.24 Arguments
against unconsented-to force do not bear against suicide and assisted sui-
cide, since the force is freely chosen by its recipients.
The libertarian approach recognizes the difficulty of modern public pol-
icy decisions, which are made in the absence of a general moral consensus
concerning the goals of life or the concrete character of good life. These
policy decisions are also made in the absence of the likelihood of discover-
ing the moral bases for a commonly shared concrete view of what consti-
tutes good life. Yet, some consensus is required in order to legitimate
public policy choices. As a result, when answers to moral questions cannot
be discovered, one will need to establish procedures for creating moral
answers. The accent of ethical concern will thus shift to the process by
which free individuals can together agree upon public policy decisions, a
move from concrete agreement regarding the material characteristics of a
common moral viewpoint to a commitment to a formal process. Since eth-
ical legitimation of public authority will depend not upon rational argu-
ments to establish a particular concrete moral viewpoint (since these do
not appear to exist), but upon the consent of the participants in this pro-
cess, the issue will be upon the areas of choice that can legitimately be held
to have been transferred to the public domain. This accent upon the pro-
rollary that when putative governmental authority cannot be traced to consent of the gov-
erned, it is illegitimate.
24. This view reflects Immanuel Kant's understanding of the moral community as one
in which its members are never used as means, but always respected as free individuals.
Consistently developing this view requires distinguishing between freedom as a good and
freedom as a side constraint. See R. NOZiCK, supra note 11, at 30-34. For example, even if
one does not highly value freedom, one can still recognize respect of freedom as a necessary
condition for the possibility of a moral community. Thus, a group of individuals may freely
decide, without coercing each other, but still acknowledge freedom as a side constraint, a
conceptual condition for the possibility of a moral community. Kant failed to draw this
distinction, and consequently condemned suicide, masturbation, and organ transplantation.
I. KANT, Metaphysiche Anfangsgrinde der Tugendlehre, in 6 KANTS WERKE 421-26 (1968).
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cess of decisionmaking, not the content of the decisions produced, makes
the legal proscription of suicide questionable. The choice to end one's life
can reasonably be argued to have been ceded to the state. One should note
that this approach recognizes a moral peculiarity of the modem state re-
quiring two tiers of moral discourse: a first tier of concrete moralities held
by particular moral communities, and a second tier involving a common
commitment across particular moral communities to a procedure for nego-
tiation among, and consent from, the participants in a state. Thus holding
that suicide is morally wrong from a particular religious viewpoint, while
at the same time holding that no general secular grounds exist to consider
suicide as wrong, would be consistent. One could conclude that although
individuals have a right to commit suicide and the state and other third
parties have no moral authority to stop rational suicides, suicide is wrong
from a particular moral viewpoint.
These reflections have implications for the significance of moral "rights"
to suicide or to assisted suicide. These rights are not to be understood as a
special claim of privileges. They signal the absence of authority on the
part of others who would interfere with rational individuals committing
suicide or assisting in the commission of suicide. Understood in this way,
moral "rights" to suicide are forwarded as reminders of the limits of the
legitimate authority of the state and other third parties. Basic human
rights are those prerogatives that no one can presume to have ceded to the
community and therefore are prima facie successful grounds for challeng-
ing the authority of the state or of third parties to authority in such areas.
To violate such a right is to have violated the minimum notion of ethics
and therefore to have acted unethically in the most essential way.
B. Judicial and Statutory Approaches
The judiciary's treatment of the right to privacy and its bearing on the
refusal of life-saving treatment suggest issues of importance in relation to
the legal questions surrounding suicide and assisted suicide. In particular,
recent rulings have tended to support a right to privacy over and above the
interests of the state. As early as 1928, Justice Brandeis expressed the right
to individual freedom in these terms: "The makers of our Constitution
...sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."'25 This statement articulated the then barely per-
ceptible impulse towards the right to privacy and individual freedom and
away from the previous paternalistic posturing of the state.
This movement favoring individual privacy received considerable impe-
25. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), holding
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
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tus with the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme
Court upheld the use of contraceptives based on the constitutional right to
privacy.2 6 The Justices disagreed as to the origin of that right, whether the
right was found in one or more of the amendments or in their penumbra,
27
but the right, albeit limited, was recognized by the Court. The right to
privacy was expanded in Roe v. Wade28 to include a qualified right to de-
termine what is done with one's own body. Roe premised its findings upon
a woman's right to privacy and imposed the compelling interest test, the
strictest standard of judicial review, upon efforts of the state to regulate
abortion. 29
Recent judicial history has evidenced a growing number of decisions
endorsing individual freedom, often on the basis of the first amendment
guarantee of free exercise of religious beliefs. 30 Others have turned on a
recognition of the right of individual self-determination. In 1960 the Kan-
sas Supreme Court upheld an individual's right to refuse surgery on these
grounds: "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of
his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of life-saving surgery . . . . 3 This view implicitly makes
refusal of life-saving treatment a fundamental right.
Despite the foregoing view, many desirous of refusing life-saving treat-
ment have met with contrary reactions. In In re President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc. 32 a patient refused a transfusion on religious
grounds. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, due to con-
cern for the support and care of the patient's seven-month-old child, over-
rode the patient's religious convictions and ordered the transfusion. 33 The
petition had originally been denied by the district court; a single judge of
the circuit court reversed that decision,34 and the reversal was approved
by a majority of the circuit court.3 5 The court reasoned that: (1) the pa-
tient was in extremis and hardly compos mentis; 36 (2) under the parens
patriae theory, the state could not allow the patient to abandon her child;
37
26. 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
27. 381 U.S. at 484-86 (right of privacy from the penumbra); id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (from the ninth amendment); id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring) (from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
28. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
29. Id. at 155. The compelling interest test requires the state to produce evidence of
harm to such a degree as to compel the outcome desired by the state. See, e.g., Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
30. For a discussion of the right to refuse treatment on the grounds of religious beliefs
alone, see In re Brooks' Estate, 32 11. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
31. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 404, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
32. 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978 (1964).
33. 331 F.2d at 1008.
34. Id. at 1002.
35. Id at 1010.
36. Id at 1008.
37. Id "The patient had a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus
the people had an interest in preserving the life of this mother." Id
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(3) an individual cannot refuse medical assistance without violating the
statute prohibiting attempted suicide; 38 (4) the patient did not want to die,
but was only trying to act in accord with her religious principles; 39 (5) the
physicians and the hospital would be risking criminal and civil liability by
respecting the patient's wishes;40 (6) the patient's religious principles were
not affected because the state, and not the individual, was making the deci-
sion;4' and (7) immediate action was necessary to save the patient's life.42
In addition, the court held that a patient could be subjected to criminal
arrest if he or she refused treatment in a hospital in a jurisdiction where
attempted suicide is illegal.43 Little guidance was given, however, regard-
ing what weight should be given to any particular point.
In response to these holdings, Judge Warren Burger, then a member of
the D.C. Circuit, wrote a dissenting opinion to the denial of the petition for
rehearing. In referring to Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead, Judge
Burger added:
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an
individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest
he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even
absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treat-
ment even at great risk. 4
Immediately following Georgetown, similar issues were raised in the Illi-
nois decision of In re Brooks'Estate.4 5 The patient, suffering from a peptic
ulcer, had repeatedly told her doctor that her religion forbade blood trans-
fusions. She and her husband signed a release of civil liability. The doc-
tor, despite promises to the patient to the contrary, applied to a state
district court for a conservator who would have authority to consent to the
transfusion. The request was granted, but the Illinois Supreme Court re-
38. Id In the course of this argument, Judge Skelly Wright explained:
It is suggested that an individual's liberty to control himself and his life ex-
tends even to the liberty to end his life. Thus, "in those states where attempted
suicide has been made lawful by statute (or the lack of one), the refusal of
necessary medical aid [to one's self], whether equal to or less than attempted
suicide, must be conceded to be lawful." Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith
Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48, 68 (1954). And, conversely, it would follow
that where attempted suicide is illegal by the common law or by statute, a
person may not be allowed to refuse necessary medical assistance when death
is likely to ensue without it. Only quibbles about the distinction between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance, or the specific intent necessary to be guilty of at-
tempted suicide, could be raised against this latter conclusion.
Id at 1008-09. One commentator has argued that in a jurisdiction where attempted suicide
is not illegal, but where aiding suicide is a crime, a physician respecting a patient's desire to
refuse life-saving treatment could be subject to criminal penalties, although his or her pa-
tient would not. See Comment, Criminal Aspects, supra note 3, at 162-63.
39. 331 F.2d at 1009.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id at 1009-10. Whether all the listed elements were necessary conditions for the
ruling is unclear.
43. Id. at 1008.
44. Id at 1017 (emphasis in original).
45. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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versed.46 The court held that the state had no compelling interest in the
case that would supplant the patient's right to free exercise of religion.
47
There were no minor children in Brooks', and the patient, unlike the pa-
tient in Georgetown, believed that her religious convictions would be com-
promised by the court's action.48
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also addressed this issue. In John
F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston49 the court held in favor of the
preservation of the patient's life:
It seems correct to say there is no constitutional right to choose to
die.
Nor is constitutional right established by adding that one's religious
faith ordains his death. Religious beliefs are absolute, but conduct in
pursuance of religious beliefs is not wholly immune from governmen-
tal restraint.
When the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts and their
interests are pitted against the belief of the patient, we think it reason-
able to resolve the problem by permitting the hospital and its staff to
pursue their functions according to their professional standards. The
solution sides with life, the conservation of which is, we think, a mat-
ter of State interest. 50
The New Jersey Supreme Court altered its position in In re Quinlan51
and found that the right of privacy encompasses a patient's decision, via
her guardian, to decline medical treatment in certain circumstances. 52 The
court reasoned that the state loses its compelling interest in the preserva-
tion of human life when no chance of the patient's regaining cognitive life
exists, and the attendant bodily invasion necessitated by medical care is
great. 53 In the case of Karen Quinlan no appreciable chance of her regain-
ing cognizance existed; thus, her interests in her own life approached or
reached zero. The court did not acknowledge a metaphysical or religious
claim that the state has a duty simpliciter, all else being equal, to preserve
life. 54 That is, one can move a step away from the view that life has a value
46. 205 N.E.2d at 435.
47. Id
48. Id at 442.
49. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
50. 279 A.2d at 672-73. The patient, Delores Heston, was incompetent, as was Karen
Quinlan, although evidence suggested that Heston could plausibly have been restored to
health.
51. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
52. 355 A.2d at 663.
53. Id at 664.
54. Id at 661. In the case of Karen Quinlan, the state did not assert a compelling
interest in preserving life as such, even if the state does have an interest in preserving life on
the basis of: (1) protecting the best interests of the individual involved (a paternalistic claim
if the individual is competent and refusing treatment); (2) arguing that the state would sus-
tain a loss if the individual died; or (3) asserting that death would lead to the individual's
defaulting on obligations. See also 1, 2 IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN: THE COM-
PLETE LEGAL BRIEFS, COURT PROCEEDINGS AND DECISION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
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in itself, and a step towards the more defensible view that life has value for
the person who lives it or for others through that person's contributions to
them. The court, however, weighed the interests of the state against those
of the individual. Additionally, most other courts that have dealt with the
refusal of life-saving treatment have agreed that the existence of minor
children constitutes a compelling interest, thus tipping the balance in favor
of state intervention. What other factors are to be considered in this re-
gard is unclear.
In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court stressed the individual's right to be free of non-
consensual invasions of bodily integrity. 55  The court held the
constitutional right of privacy encompasses "the right of a patient to pre-
serve his or her right to privacy against unwanted infringement of bodily
integrity," even if the patient is incompetent.56 Noting a state interest in
the preservation of human life,57 the protection of third parties,5 8 and the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession, 59 the court
nevertheless stated:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression
of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fun-
damental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is less-
ened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow
a competent human being the right of choice. 60
This statement thus approximates the libertarian principle that the most
crucial consideration is respect for the wishes of the person involved. 61
NEW JERSEY (1975); Bennet, In the Shadow of Karen Quinlan, 12 TRIAL, Sept. 1976, at 36;
Hyland & Baime, In re Quinlan.: A Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 8 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 37 (1976); Note, The Tragic Choice.: Termination of Carefor Patients in a Permanent
Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 285 (1976).
55. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
56. Id. at 424.
57. Id at 425.
58. Id. at 426.
59. Id
60. Id
61. These rulings indicate a variety of legal postures regarding the refusal of life-saving
treatment, which range from protection of the state's interests in its citizens to a recognition
of the right to privacy as noninterference. The literature reflecting on the right to refuse life-
saving treatment is considerable. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 3; Evans, The Right to Die-A
Basic Constitutional Right, 5 J. LEGAL MED., Aug. 1977, at 17; Robitscher, The Right to Die,
2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (1972); Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical
Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860 (1965); Note,*Is There a Right to a Natural Death?, 9 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 293 (1974).
Although right to refuse treatment cases have not referred to the issue of battery, protec-
tion against battery is construed as the protection against unauthorized touching, as
Saikewicz suggests. Protection against nonconsensual provisions of life-saving treatment is
thus a species of protection against unauthorized touching. Protection against battery in-
cludes protection against unauthorized benefit as well as harm. One should note, however,
that the battery issue has not caused physicians difficulty; the presumption in emergency
cases is in favor of treatment, such as treating minors without parental consent. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4503 (Smith-Hurd 1978). The right to be secure against battery
when viewed in terms of respect of freedom expresses a right to be secure against bodily
intrusions, even when such touching is in one's best interests. Since no attempt is made to
ground the right to be secure from battery in an appeal to the individual as the best judge of
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Saikewicz suggests a libertarian reading of the right to refuse treatment,
and more generally of the right to be left alone, although the court bal-
anced that interest against other state interests. In indicating that respect
for the wishes of the individual refusing treatment is a paramount consid-
eration, Saikewicz supports the moral principle that underlies the recom-
mendation that neither suicide, nor aiding and abetting suicide, should be
disciplined with legal sanctions: the state exists to protect the freedom of
its members. 62
These decisions tolerating the individual's choice to refuse life-saving
treatment contrast with the traditional disapproval of suicide. English
common law held that suicide was an act of immorality and thus a crime.63
In his Commentaries, Blackstone stated that: "[T]he suicide is guilty of a
double offence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty,
and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal,
against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects
.... ,,64 English penalties levied against thefelo de se included forfeiture
of all land and burial in a public highway. Comparable sanctions were
never adopted in this country;65 however, at least three states still consider
suicide a crime or an act of immorality. 66 In addition, other states forbid
attempted suicide.67 These laws exist now primarily as vehicles for forcing
his or her interests, and since protection against battery recognizes a limited right to capri-
cious refusal of touching by another, the right to be secure against battery expresses a pre-
rogative of self-determination. Thus, protection against battery should also include
protection against the imposition of unauthorized life-saving treatment for a suicide. In fact,
when Texas lacked not only a law against suicide, but one against assisting suicide (absent
reasonable evidence of incompetence of the parties), forcibly stopping a competent suicide
probably would have constituted an instance of battery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. app.
tit. 15, art. 1138 (repealed 1973).
62. Societies can either be founded on mutual respect of their members or instead em-
ploy force in achieving agreement. The libertarian position argues that a moral society is
one not based on force. A society based on mutual respect of its members' freedom can, of
course, use force in self-defense, in defending the innocent, and in enforcing contracts. But
as long as a society refuses to impose ideas upon its constituents, the society is compatible
with the notion of a community based on mutual self-respect, a moral community.
63. See, e.g., Hales v. Petit, I Plowden 253, 76 Eng. Rep. 387 (1562).
64. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903).
66. Alabama, Oregon, and South Carolina have each held suicide to be a crime. See
Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala. App. 209, 194 So. 421 (1940); Wyckoff v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Or. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944); State v. Levell, 13 S.E. 319 (S.C.
1891).
67. See Royal Circle v. Achterrach, 204 I11. 549, 68 N.E. 492 (1903); Wallace v. State,
232 Ind. 700,116 N.E.2d 100 (1953); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903); cf. D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-103, -2401 (1981) (provision for penalty of any attempt to commit a crime
and first degree murder provision). Some District of Columbia authorities have asserted
that these statutes are applied in cases of attempted suicide, but no case law is available.
Massachusetts has held attempted suicide to be an unpunishable crime since suicide is not
illegal. Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105
Mass. 162 (1870). One would presume that in states such as Alabama, Oregon, and South
Carolina, where the common law presumption against suicide has not been set aside, at-
tempted suicide could be considered a crime as well. In New Jersey a suicide attempt is a
misdemeanor because suicide was a crime at common law. State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478,
55 A. 44, 45 (1903).
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treatment upon the would-be suicide.68
Criminal sanctions under case or statutory law for aiding and abetting
suicide, as opposed to committing suicide, are much more widespread, and
exist in the vast majority of states.69 The illegality of aiding and abetting
suicide has generally fallen into two categories. One set of jurisdictions
categorizes successfully aiding a suicide as murder 70 or as manslaughter.7'
Other jurisdictions set assisting suicide apart by creating a statute sui
generis72 because of the decriminalization of the act of suicide itself in
most jurisdictions. This latter structure, the predominant one, reflects a
68. William L. Parry-Jones has argued that laws against attempted suicide have func-
tioned as inappropriate paternalistic means for imposing treatment on competent individu-
als. Parry-Jones, supra note 3.
69. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1978); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1504 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
3-104 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1979); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3406 (1981); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 979-3-49 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.021 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1978); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1975); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125
(1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1973); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1385
(1969); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37
(1979); Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.08 (Vernon 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.12 (West 1982).
Some states, however, have apparently not treated suicide or assisting or aiding and abet-
ting suicide in either statutory or case law. These states could rely upon the theory that
assisting suicide is the same as acting as a principal to the crime of self-murder. See, e.g.,
McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 63 So. 89 (1910).
70. See Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903); People v. Roberts, 211 Mich.
187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920) (murder conviction reversed because of insufficient evidence).
This classification is defined as "homicide at the request of the victim." Comment, The Right
to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 656 (1970).
71. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1504 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-56 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1981).
72. The phrase "sui generis," meaning "of its own kind," "unique," refers to statutes
that are enacted to deal with a particular offense, rather than expanding the purview of pre-
existing statutes. States that have criminalized assisting suicide as a specific offense include
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56 (West 1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3406 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (Vernon 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-6 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (Mc-
Kinney 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981-1982); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1973); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1385 (1969); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
The District of Columbia does not include assisting suicide under its homicide statutes,
nor does it have a sui generis statute, Instead, it strangely refers to assisting suicide in its
Natural Death Act. Following the patient's directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures is specified as not being the "crime of assisting suicide." D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2428(a) (Supp. VI 1982). Since no statutory or case law on assisting suicide in the District of
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fundamental shift in the understanding of the law. Since public morals are
no longer imposed upon the would-be suicide, the traditional rationale
that would support the proscription of assisting suicide as the assistance of
a crime is accordingly eroded.
C Policy Considerations
Less libertarian views may also support the claim of a legal right to re-
fuse life-saving treatment or to assist suicide. 73 Libertarians and public
welfare proponents may agree on a conclusion, although they disagree on
the basis for the conclusion. Additionally, in applying the compelling in-
terest test to suicide, a court would probably be affected by the factual
circumstances of the suicide. Suicide can be either the decision to die
when death is not imminent, or the choice to die in the circumstances of an
already fatal and severely debilitating illness. In the latter situation, the
state's interest may be vastly diminished. If death is relatively certain in
the near future, arguments for imposing additional suffering on the indi-
vidual would at best be weak.74 In contrast, in the suicide of a healthy
contributing member of society the state's legitimate interest may be
strong.75 It may also be strong in the case of persons with dependents. In
addition, the state's interest in enforcing contracts could be brought to bear
upon persons with major unfulfilled obligations who desire to die. The
interests of the state, however, are usually rendered less than compelling
by the incapacities of terminal, debilitating illnesses. 76 In the latter cir-
cumstances both the libertarian and the defender of a compelling state in-
terest test would find themselves in agreement: suicide should be allowed.
The rationales would differ, however. The libertarian would maintain a
right simpliciter to suicide while the compelling state interest protagonist
would maintain that in such cases the government has insufficient interest
to require intervention. Additionally, proponents of the compelling state
interest test might argue that in some cases, because of the extreme circum-
stances of the individuals involved, such as an aged invalid's choosing sui-
cide rather than a protracted death involving considerable costs that would
be borne by the government, suicide would be in the interests of the state.
Columbia exists, the legislators may have presumed that the precedent of other jurisdictions
would apply to their own.
Also of some interest is the approach taken by Indiana, which has a criminal statute on
causing, rather than assisting, suicide. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (Bums 1979). Finally,
while Texas was criminalizing assisting suicide, two states-North Carolina and North Da-
kota-repealed their statutes on suicide and assisting suicide.
73. An argument has been made, for example, in favor of a right to suicide in terms of
constitutional law. Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPH-
ICAL ISSUES 229 (M. Battin & D. Mayo eds. 1980).
74. The Quinlan court expressly referred to this balancing of interests. "We think that
the State's interest contra [ending treatment] weakens and the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
75. A libertarian would deny that simply being a healthy member of society gave soci-
ety a claim over that person.
76. See D. HUME, Of Suicide, in 4 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 406-14 (1964).
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The reasons that can be advanced, however, for the criminalization of
suicide and aiding and abetting suicide are diverse. The state can be re-
garded as (1) preventing citizens from committing an offense against God;
(2) rescuing citizens from choices that are imprudent albeit dangerous only
to themselves; (3) protecting the state's interests in the productivity of its
citizens; (4) preserving respect for life because of the utility of the social
practices underlying this respect, including preserving the public against
affront and distress from confrontation with disapproved and anxiety-pro-
voking practices; and (5) protecting legal relationships undertaken by
agreement. The first rationale, the concern not to offend God, is an inap-
propriate consideration for a pluralistic society in which divergent and ir-
reconcilable opinions concerning the desires or the existence of a deity
exist.77 Imposing any particular religious opinion upon society would be
an act of force. The second reason is, as already argued, improperly pater-
nalistic. The third, fourth, and fifth reasons concern issues of state interest
and may, in varying circumstances, be more or less compelling. Further,
the third and fourth reasons bear on concerns about the public economy
and social anxieties, and militate against governmental respect for the au-
tonomy of persons in making private decisions. The last rationale focuses
on relationships that have a moral claim prior to, and independent of, the
institution of the state, such as oral contracts. In this circumstance the
state could have an interest both in terms of general utility and concern for
autonomy.78
II. TEXAS LAW: A CASE STUDY IN LEGALIZED SUICIDE AND AIDING
AND ABETTING SUICIDE
Unlike other jurisdictions, Texas has never imposed statutory criminal
sanctions for suicide. Texas forged a solitary path with an explicit, limited
legitimization of assisting suicide at the beginning of the century. The
77. See, e.g., the prohibition of prayer in public schools. In School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the United States Supreme Court asserted:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from
a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might
bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or
dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State
or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all
orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason
for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value
of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right
of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of
any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees.
78. The last point might suggest that only unmarried individuals without debts or de-
pendents would be free to commit suicide, unless they were dying or severely disabled. Soci-
ety, however, has allowed individuals not only the opportunity to divorce and place their
children for adoption, but to establish insurance policies for legal liabilities. If societies
wished to forbid suicide to those with such obligations, liability insurance with minimal
payments could no doubt be developed. If the insurance were required to be in effect a
number of years prior to validity, premiums would likely be reasonable as a result of the
relatively low incidence of suicides. The policy would in effect insure against circumstances
rational individuals would consider as grounds for suicide.
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals premised this deviation from the hold-
ings of all other United States jurisdictions upon the legal rule that, as
suicide was not illegal in Texas, it could not be a crime to aid a noncrimi-
nal act.79
A. The Aberrant Jurisdiction
The first Texas case dealing with the criminal issue of aiding suicide,
Grace v. State, was heard by the court of criminal appeals in 1902.80 In
Grace the defendant, J.H. Grace, was charged with homicide. A married
physician, Grace had allegedly been criminally intimate with a local wo-
man. The couple had possible plans for elopement. The woman's family
threatened to shoot Grace, who was rescued by his father. The woman
then attempted suicide by procuring digitalis from the defendant's medical
bag, but the attempt was thwarted. Grace was later warned to be armed in
the event that the woman's family should again seek him out, and he ac-
cepted a pistol. Grace and his wife retired, sleeping in separate beds; the
woman slept on the floor between them and next to a night stand on which
Dr. Grace had placed his pistol. The woman took the pistol, shot herself
in the chest, and died. Grace was later convicted of homicide.
The Texas appellate court reversed and remanded the conviction, stat-
ing that the homicide statute under which Grace had been charged re-
quired that the "victim of the accused [not be] cognizant of the intent of
the accused in preparing the means for the destruction of his or her life."'8'
The deceased in the instant case voluntarily shot herself and was clearly
aware of the consequences of her actions. The court also pointed out that
suicide was legal in Texas, and regardless of what "may have been the law
in England, or whatever that law may be now with reference to suicides,
and the punishment of persons connected with suicide, by furnishing the
means or other agencies, it does not obtain in Texas."'8 2 The court by its
own admission was aware of the holdings in other jurisdictions on this
issue, but persisted in setting its solitary precedent.
In 1908 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this position in
Sanders v. State.83 The defendant had purchased two vials of carbolic
acid, purportedly to kill screw worms in animals. Later that week, a wo-
man friend of the defendant was found dead with two empty vials near her
body. The defendant was charged with murder; the state alleged his mo-
tive was to rid himself of the deceased and her soon-to-be-born child. The
defendant raised the defense, based on the Grace holding, that the de-
ceased had voluntarily taken the poison. The appellate court reversed the
jury's guilty verdict, but drew the distinction that suicide assistance must
79. See Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 102, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (1908); Grace v. State,
44 Tex. Crim. 193, 194, 69 S.W. 529, 530 (1902).
80. 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
81. Id. at 195, 69 S.W. at 530.
82. Id
83. 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908).
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be passive, not active, to be a defense to murder.8 4 For example, shooting
someone upon request would equate with active suicide assistance for
which the actor would be guilty of first degree murder.8 5
A third Texas case, Aven v. State,8 6 addressed this same issue in 1925.
Aven administered arsenic to his wife, purportedly at her request. The
trial court's murder conviction was affirmed on appeal, however, because
of the court's adherence to the active-passive distinction: "[If the party]
himself gives the medicine or poison by placing it in the mouth or other
portions of the body, which would lead to the destruction of life, then it
would be the act of the party giving [it] ....
Two further Texas cases arising out of the same fact situation clearly
illustrated active assistance in suicide.88 The deceased wished to die and
was willing to pay a thousand dollars to anyone who would end his life for
him. Carew introduced the deceased to Mullane and encouraged Mullane
to take the assignment. Mullane, after receiving nine hundred dollars, shot
the deceased twice in the head. Both Mullane and Carew were found
guilty of murder, because their assistance in the suicide was active.89
These cases are important because they lack any moral or philosophical
justifications for their position. Only in Sanders are such extra-legal con-
siderations mentioned, and there they are mentioned in opposition to the
court's holding:
84. Id at 105, 112 S.W. at 70.
85. Id In 1920 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a man's murder conviction for
supplying poison to his wife at her request, so that she could end her sufferings due to
multiple sclerosis. That court, in contrast to the Texas courts, stated: "It is beyond my
comprehension how a human being of normal conditions. . . can commit such a crime as
you have in this case, by placing poison within reach of your wife or giving it to your wife
with the intention as you claim." People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690, 692
(1920). This case would appear to have met all the elements given in Sanders for legally
assisting suicide. For a very helpful discussion of this case, see Francis, Assisting Suicide.4 A
Problem for the Criminal Law, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 254 (M. Battin & D.
Mayo eds. 1980).
86. 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
87. Id. at 483, 277 S.W. at 1083.
88. Mullane v. State, 475 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Carew v. State, 471
S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
89. Mullane, 475 S.W.2d at 926; Carew, 471 S.W.2d at 861. Applying the court's hold-
ings to a medical situation, if one physician urged another to actively aid a consenting pa-
tient in suicide, both would be guilty of murder since consent is irrelevant in homicide. One
might, however, question whether an intrinsic moral difference between active and passive
assistance of suicide exists. In either case, one is intending to help a competent person take
his own life. Neither passive nor active assistance involves unconsented-to force against an
unsuspecting person. In fact, both active and passive assistance involve respect for the indi-
vidual as a free person and are thus compatible with a peaceable moral community.
This analysis suggests that the evil of murder is not the taking of another's life, but taking
it without consent. Murder would then be defined as the unconsented-to killing of another.
As the moral fault of robbery could be defeated by a gift of the object stolen, for example,
consent of the person to be killed would defeat the moral fault of murder in active suicide
assistance. Such considerations may erode the legitimacy of the legal proscription of other
forms of consensual killing, such as dueling. Each practice, however, would need to be
examined in detail. Extraneous reasons for drawing a legal distinction between active and
passive assistance of suicide may in fact exist. This Article, howeVer, is restricted to the
issues raised by suicide and passive facilitation of suicide.
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It may be a violation of morals and ethics and reprehensible that a
party may furnish another poison or pistols or guns or any other
means or agency for the purpose of the suicide to take his own life, yet
our law has not seen proper to punish such persons or such acts.90
Thus, the primary rationale in these cases was that no legal reason existed
to impose criminal sanctions on behavior that facilitated noncriminal
behavior.
In distinguishing between passively and actively assisted suicide, the
Texas courts placed the onus of the definitive act upon the suicide. The
suicide was obliged to be the last actor in the causal chain. The one assist-
ing the suicide could not relieve the suicide of his responsibility for the last
act. These reflections suggest a way in which the court might have been
discouraging some precipitous suicides that could have occurred had the
suicide been allowed to engage another to kill him. Moreover, by allowing
passively assisted suicide as a defense to murder, factual distinctions be-
tween suicide and murder are more clearly made.
Prior to 1973, Texas law did not speak to the issue of soliciting another
to commit suicide. Presumably, as long as neither physical nor psychologi-
cal coercion is involved, the usual manipulations ingredient in human
transactions are to be tolerated. Soliciting the commission of an act that is
neither criminal nor morally forbidden to free individuals should not be a
crime or an act of immorality in itself. For this purpose, the line between
coercions and manipulations is drawn as the line between threatening to
deprive a party of his entitlements versus offering inducements to which
the party is not entitled, as long as the inducements do not overbear the
party's free will.91 Although the argument has been made that solicitation
should not be allowed,92 such a position does not take seriously the status
of competent individuals. The question is not whether one person has con-
vinced another of the merits of suicide, but whether force, deception, coer-
cion, or some other form of overreaching has been employed. Free
individuals, however, have the right to expose themselves not only to rea-
sons, but also to freely chosen manipulations. The peaceable community
must prohibit unconsented-to force, but not peaceable manipulations.
. The Abrupt Realignment: Influence of the Model Penal Code
The position held by these cases was dramatically reversed when, in
1973, the Texas Legislature adopted the new Texas Penal Code. The Code
makes aiding suicide illegal, with intent as the requisite mens rea.93 The
statute distinguishes punishment on the basis of whether the suicide has
been successful, with penalties ranging from a fine not to exceed two hun-
dred dollars94 to imprisonment for two to ten years. A fine of up to five
90. 54 Tex. Crim. at 105, 112 S.W. at 70.
91. For a discussion of the difference between coercion and manipulation, see Rudinow,
Manpulation, 88 ETHICS 338 (1978).
92. Francis, supra note 85, at 254.
93. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974).
94. Id § 12.23.
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thousand dollars is also possible if serious bodily injury results. 95 Other
changes in the Texas Penal Code directly and indirectly affected suicide
assistance liability, particularly through changes concerning assault and
battery. Under the new Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense
of assault if he "intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with
another when he knows or should reasonably believe that the other will
regard the contact as offensive or provocative. '96 This change again is a
significant departure from prior law; previously the criminal law of assault
and battery had necessitated proof of intent to injure. 97 In the practice
commentary to the new code, the significance of this distinction is recog-
nized: "Under [the new Penal Code] the victim's idiosyncracies rather
than the actor's culpability can determine criminal responsibility, if the
fact-finder agrees that they are not too unreasonable, with the probable
result that many innocuous touchings will become the subject of criminal
complaints. '98 Prior law set forth seven recognized reasons legitimizing
the use of violence to the person.99 These reasons included: "where vio-
lence is permitted to effect a lawful purpose, only that degree of force must
be used which is necessary to effect such purpose." '0 Under current Texas
law, however, and against this expanded protection against battery, a spe-
cific provision justifies the use of force with regard to suicide:
(a) A person is justified in using force, but not deadly force, against
another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide
or inflicting serious bodily injury to himself.
(b) A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against
another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or
deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an
emergency.101
In short, the prospective suicide is bereft of protection against battery, a
significant change from past legal attitudes in Texas.
Clearly, the Texas Legislature was strongly influenced by the Model Pe-
nal Code to change the law established by Texas courts. Approved by the
American Law Institute in May of 1962, the Model Penal Code designates
causing suicide by force, duress, or deception as criminal homicide. Aid-
ing or soliciting suicide is classified as a second degree felony if the suicide
95. Id § 12.34. Other states also have differentiated punishment on the basis of the
effect of the assistance. Pennsylvania has provided that the act is a second degree felony if
the suicide is attempted or effected; otherwise, the act is a second degree misdemeanor. 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1973). Minnesota has levied up to 15 years' impris-
onment and up to a $15,000 fine for aiding a successful suicide. The penalties drop to a
maximum of 7 years and $7,000 in the case of an unsuccessful attempt. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.215 (West 1964).
96. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
97. Id app. § 1138 (repealed 1973).
98. Id § 22.02 practice commentary (Vernon 1974).
99. Id app. § 1142 (repealed 1973).
100. Id § 1142(7).
101. Id § 9.34 (Vernon 1974).
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is undertaken and a misdemeanor if it is not. 102 The comments to the ninth
tentative draft of the Model Penal Code are enlightening as to the law's
rationale: "We think . . . the wiser course is to maintain the prohibition
[on aiding suicide] and rely on mitigation in the sentence when the ground
for it appears. The powers of the Court under the Code are adequate for
such a purpose." 103 The authors of the Model Penal Code's ninth tentative
draft had expressed concern over the possibility that "flagrant murders
may be perpetrated by deliberately forcing or coercing self-destruction." 104
These comments point out that the lesser criminal classifications apply
only when the actor passively aids the suicide; if the actor is "the agent of
death, the crime is murder."' 10 5
The commentators to the Model Code mention motivation as an irrele-
vant factor:
[T]he draft is broad enough to allow a reduction of the crime to man-
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
103. Id § 201.5 comment 1 (9th Tent. Draft 1959).
104. Id
105. Id comment 2. These comments reflect the recurring active-passive distinction.
For a discussion of the ethical significance, or lack thereof, of the distinction between active
and passive complicity in the death of another, see Abrams, Active and Passive Euthanasia,
54 PHIL. 257 (1978); Bennett, Whatever the Consequences, 26 ANALYSIS 83 (1966); Dinello,
On Killing and Letting Die, 31 ANALYSIS 83 (1970); Fitzgerald, Acting and Refraining, 27
ANALYSIS 133 (1967); Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78
(1975). With respect to the active-passive distinction, one should note that in practice it is
often used to obscure a distinction between intended outcomes and foreseen outcomes.
Thus, in the case of not providing treatment necessary for preserving life, the nonprovider
may more persuasively claim that he has not willed to kill, but that another process has been
the cause of the person's death, such as a fatal disease. Further, this mode of analysis has
been used to distinguish between the merely foreseen as opposed to the foreseen and in-
tended consequences of an act. Arguably, one need only take moral responsibility for the
latter. This distinction has been followed through the theory of double effect, so that one
could, for example, stop an expensive life-saving treatment that one did not owe to another.
Stoppage of treatment would be justified not in order to kill the patient, but in order to use
resources through which they would have a greater chance of success. What is at stake,
however, is not the distinction between killing and allowing one to die, but a distinction
between foreseen and intended consequences of action. Thus, the theory of double effect
allows one to give a drug to a patient in severe pain in a dosage that might indeed lead to the
patient's dying earlier. But as long as one does not intend to kill that patient, and there is a
due proportion between the risks and benefits involved, no liability exists under double ef-
fect. Classically, the principles of double effect required that: one not directly intend the
death; the good sought, the depression of pain, not follow simply from the death; the act
itself not be a moral evil; and there be a proportionate good in view, that is, that the pain be
severe enough to risk a quicker death. For a critical review of this theory, see DOING EVIL
TO ACHIEVE GOOD: MORAL CHOICE IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS (R. McCormick & P. Ram-
sey eds. 1978).
These distinctions cease to be important if killing the consenting patient is not immoral
and one is dealing with a competent individual. The same is true with regard to the distinc-
tion between acting and refraining. The distinction is morally significant in suicide or assist-
ing suicide if there is a moral rule against the intention to kill another and if cases of passive
assistance offer more opportunity to avoid the responsibility of directly aiding another in
suicide. Passive assistance appears to many to offer such opportunities, a fact of human
psychology that may lie behind the notion that allowing active facilitation of suicide is seen
to have, and may indeed have, more potential for abuse than passive facilitation. Given the
arguments in this Article concerning a libertarian view of the morality of suicide, the distinc-
tion between passive and active facilitation, should it have moral force, must depend upon
the extrinsic properties of the distinctions, not the basic moral issue of suicide.
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slaughter when the act is done in a state of emotional distress and that
it is enough beyond this to provide, as we do, that consent is a factor
to be weighed against a capital sentence in a jurisdiction that employs
the penalty of death.,06
Emotional distress would, however, be arduous to prove in the case of sui-
cide aiders other than family members. Additionally, the use of consent as
mitigation only in capital sentences is an extreme limitation. The com-
mentators finally stated that they did not believe homicide upon request
should be excusable if the actor were motivated unselfishly.,0 7 They re-
garded this as a "more extreme position than the argument for tolerance of
euthanasia, a movement that has scant support in the U.S."'10 8
The Texas Legislature apparently accepted these rationalizations, and
Texas accordingly revised its penal code. In a report requested by the
Texas Legislature to determine the advisability of prohibiting assisted sui-
cide, a committee of the state bar argued that:
Since the present Texas law does not proscribe assisting a willing sui-
cide the actor who participates as an accomplice or accessory will go
unpunished but the actor who participates as a perpetrator in the
death of a willing suicide will be indicted for murder. In both situa-
tions the antisocial result is the same. In view of the historical back-
ground, if the gap is to be bridged, then positive legislation is
necessary.
Situations will arise when suicide will have been aided because of un-
selfish motives, such as when an actor places a poison within the easy
reach of a person bedridden with an agonizing terminal disease, both
knowing the invalid will ingest some and die. In such a case as well as
where an actor's motive is selfish, such as a 50 percent successful sui-
cide pact, the result is the same and only the motive differs. The
quantum of punishment may vary between the two cases but the con-
duct producing the socially undesirable result should be proscribed. '0 9
In short, the report advised that permitting assisted suicide was antisocial
without further elaboration or argument for that assertion. Additionally,
the report offered no examples of abuse or social cost although Texas had
for decades allowed assisted suicide. The report upon which the legisla-
ture acted did not demonstrate that assisted suicide should be proscribed
because of an obvious and pressing need for legislative reform. I0
C. Foreign Jurisdictions
Many other jurisdictions have considered legislation dealing with sui-
cide and assisted suicide. One of the most extensive analyses of such
changes in the law was in response to English legislation. In a survey arti-
cle, William Parry-Jones outlined the criminal status and statistics of sui-
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 comment 2 (9th Tent. Draft 1959).
107. Id
108. Id
109. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, REPORT ON AIDING
SUICIDE AND RECKLESS CONDUCT 4-5 (1969).
110. See id at 4.
1982] SUICIDE 1027
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
cide and attempted suicide in Britain by reviewing the last decade of
prosecutions under England's Suicide Act of 1961."'1 In that legislation
attempting suicide was decriminalized, but new provisions were made for
other parties' complicity in suicide. The law reflects the British concern for
suicide pact cases, a concern that traditionally has not been shared by
American legislators. 1 2 Parry-Jones addressed, in particular, the impact
of this legislation. In the years 1969-1970, eighty English suicide cases
were reported to the Director of Public Prosecution; criminal proceedings
were instituted in twelve of these cases. Nine of the twelve cases involved
suicide pacts. In one case both partners to the pact were prosecuted."l 3
Twelve of the thirteen individuals pleaded guilty under the Suicide Act.
Nevertheless, only one prison sentence was given, 1 4 despite provisions for
a life sentence for an active accessory to the act. 1 5 The sole prison sen-
tence handed down was suspended for three years. Sentences in the ma-
jority of the remaining cases involved either probation or admission to a
psychiatric hospital."l 6
These data led Parry-Jones to the issues raised by the 1973 change in
Texas law. The creation of the suicide offense in Britain violates the legal
principle underpinning previous Texas law, namely that aiding of a non-
crime cannot be criminal. The policy reason purportedly underlying the
British statute is to afford officials the opportunity to insure compulsory
mental health treatment when necessary. This motive is clearly paternalis-
tic if the individual is legally competent, a consideration that has led some
to question the extent to which this attitude is appropriate if it violates the
freedom of an innocent person.' '7 The motive is also suspect if the goal is
to protect the incompetent, for independent means of protecting those in-
dividuals exist, such as commitment: "It cannot be right to make use of
criminal proceedings merely for the purpose of providing medical and so-
cial assistance to people in distress if some other and more appropriate
method of giving that assistance can be found."' 18 Considering the rela-
tively small number of people who plan and attempt suicide, Parry-Jones
suggested the Mental Health Act' 19 as the appropriate vehicle for endors-
I11. Parry-Jones, supra note 3, at 112; see Suicide Act 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 60.
112. Where aiding and abetting suicide is a crime in the United States, being a member
of a suicide pact is not a defense. Unless the survivor of a suicide pact has abandoned his
purpose in the pact, and has endeavored to dissuade the suicide partner, the survivor could
be held guilty of murder, at least where suicide is held to be self-murder. See, e.g., McMa-
han v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998 (1909).
Some courts have also held that a person who unintentionally kills another while attempting
suicide, but who fails to kill himself, is guilty of murder. Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116
N.E.2d 100 (1953); State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933); Commonwealth
v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891).
113. Parry-Jones, supra note 3, at 117-18.
114. Id at 116.
115. Id at Ill.
116. Id at 116.
117. See R. CROSS & P. JONES, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 152 (6th ed.
1968).
118. 644 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 834 (1961) (remarks of Fletcher-Cooke).
119. Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 72.
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ing needed treatment in England.120 On the broader subject of euthanasia,
the author concluded that the present moral climate still considers that act
unacceptable; "there is, therefore, no alternative other than that killing by
consent should render the killer liable to trial for murder, however
merciful are his intentions."' 121
In spite of Parry-Jones's closing comment, several countries do allow
consent to suicide to mitigate the offense statutorily from murder to a
lesser crime. The India Penal Code, for example, provides that consent of
a victim over the age of eighteen to suicide vitiates the murder charge; 122
the resulting punishment is thereby reduced to transportation for life or
imprisonment of up to ten years. 123 Switzerland prescribes imprisonment
of only up to three years when the action was at the victim's explicit re-
quest, but only when the suicide is upon the victim's "earnest and urgent
request."' 24 Lastly, Uruguay allows its judges to forgo any punishment
whatsoever when the aider to the suicide has previously been honorable
and was responding to repeated requests from the victim.
125
III. ADDITIONAL LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SUICIDE ISSUES
A. Criminal Liability of Physicians
No published American opinions have reported convictions of physi-
cians for aiding, abetting, or assisting suicide.' 26 This lack of reported
cases is perhaps due to prosecutorial decisions not to pursue potential vio-
lators, thereby leaving no avenue for judicial comment. Even in cases of
active assistance, prosecution and conviction are rare. Newspaper reports
have documented acquittals of physicians who have allegedly aided a sui-
cide. For example, Dr. Herman Sander injected a fatal air embolism into
the blood vessels of a carcinoma victim, who had reputedly urged him to
end her misery. He was acquitted in New Hampshire. 27 Dr. Vincent
Montemarano of New York was accused of administering a lethal injec-
tion to a comatose patient. He also was found not guilty of assisting a
suicide. ' 28
Although society has tolerated intervention by physicians in suicide
120. Parry-Jones, supra note 3, at 119.
121. Id
122. INDIA PEN. CODE § 300, exception 5 (1860).
123. Id § 304.
124. SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH art. 114 (1942). The Swiss Criminal Code
also examines the selfishness of the motivation to determine the criminality of the action.
Id arts. 114, 115. Denmark's statutory treatment is quite similar. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE
art. 239-40 (1958).
125. URUGUAY PENAL CODE art. 37, at 367 n.74.
126. This year an attorney was convicted for buying poison to administer to his wheel-
chair-bound wife. His defense was that he was acting upon her wishes, that is, assisting in
her suicide. There was, however, contradictory evidence; he was sentenced to three years in
prison and fined $5,000. Newsweek, Aug. 16, 1982, at 27.
127. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1.
128. Houston Chronicle, June 22, 1973, § 4, at 10, col. 1. Courtroom observers ap-
plauded the verdict.
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cases, many important utilitarian considerations can be raised, focusing
upon the notion of not undermining the physician's role as protector of
life, that would argue against physicians' involving themselves in the ac-
tive facilitation of suicide. In contrast, passive facilitation should be seen
as the means by which physicians can allow their patients, should they so
choose, to end their lives. These means can usually be effected so that the
physician is not explicitly the abettor of the suicide. 129 In any event, al-
lowing physicians to contribute to the free choice by patients, through the
provision of materials for the suicide of rational individuals, is unlikely to
erode the role of physicians, as the history of Texas law indicates. To al-
low this modest participation in suicide, however, statutory amendments
concerning the prescription of dangerous substances might be necessary.
These statutory amendments would assure that no criminal liability would
arise when the physician can foresee that the patient might employ a pre-
scribed substance in an act of suicide.
B. Civil Liabilities for Physicians
The primary civil method of recovery against a physician for aiding and
abetting a suicide is in tort under wrongful death statutes. This remedy
does not exist at common law, but is governed wholly by statute. The
Texas statute, for example, provides that: "When an injury causing the
death of any person . . . is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, careless-
ness, unskillfulness, or default of another person ... such person ...
shall be liable in damages for the injuries causing such death."' 30 This
statute is drawn somewhat more broadly than the majority of statutes;
most statutes limit recovery to the pecuniary loss occasioned by the death.
Wrongful death statutes are for the most part fashioned after Lord Camp-
bell's Act131 and allow compensation to the decedent's beneficiaries for lost
support, services, or contributions of the deceased during what would have
been the remainder of his lifetime.' 32 In assisting suicide of a terminal
patient, this would probably be a negligible award. The nuisance factor of
these suits, however, makes avoidance desirable.' 33
129. Suppose, for example, a physician gives to a patient dying of a painful terminal
disease sufficient morphine, if taken in the prescribed dosage every 6 hours, to blunt the
pain. The physician, however, notes that if the entire prescription were taken at one time,
the patient would die. The physician thus maintains a neutral stance and allows the patient
to act as he might choose. The Hippocratic Oath provides: "Neither will I administer
poison to anyone when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course." Oath, 1 HIp-
POCRATES 299 (W. Jones trans. 1923). The oath, however, also forbids the practice of sur-
gery: "I will not use the knife, not even, verily, on sufferers from stone, but will give place to
such as are craftsmen therein." Id The oath, therefore, cannot be followed literally.
130. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Other causes of action
are possible. See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751 (1950). An important alternate action would be a
charge of negligence by the physician. See, e.g., Bornmann v. Great Sw. Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
453 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir. 1971) (physician and hospital found not negligent in death of
patient by drug overdose).
131. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
132. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971).
133. Wrongful death actions have been brought against physicians after individuals un-
dergoing psychiatric treatment committed suicide. See, e.g., Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69
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Aside from the consensual issue, the elements usually necessary to main-
tain a wrongful death action are: decedent's right to sue if death had not
occurred, negligence, proximate cause of death, reasonable foreseeability
of death, and in the presence of a specific duty of care, the breach of that
duty. 134 Factors considered in determining the duty and breach of care
include the voluntariness of the patient's stay, type of hospital, necessity of
hospitalization, lack of compensation by the physician, lack of special su-
pervision of the patient, and most critically, foreseeability. 135
While no cases have been reported that address the issue of civil liability
for physicians aiding a suicide or the possibly different scope of euthana-
sia, 136 the position of physicians in such cases would be tenuous. In some
jurisdictions consent to a criminal act does not bar civil liability. 37 Else-
where, consent may bar liability under the doctrine of volenti non fit in-
juria, legal privilege stemming from consent, and the in pari delecti
argument that those who have engaged in a wrongful or illegal deed can-
not maintain an action in the courts. 138 That is, if the assisted suicide fails,
the aspirant suicide cannot initiate a suit for recovery for damages due to
the process of attempting suicide. In addition, legal doctrine provides that
one individual cannot give another license to do senseless injury to that
individual. 139
Interest has been markedly lacking in the civil liability of anyone, in-
cluding physicians, involved in aiding suicides. Two reasons have been
suggested for this: (1) the lack of precedent due to various theories of re-
covery-assault, battery, intentional inflicting of mental distress-with
concomitant variance in individual interests and court holdings; and
(2) the dramatically uninspired nature of most civil actions, especially
when compared with criminal prosecutions. 140 Nevertheless, the general
issue of civil liability for causing suicide has attracted some attention. 141 A
1971 study did unfortunately, suggest imposing civil liability even in the
Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical
Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967). Since these individuals were
under psychiatric treatment, one might presume incompetence and argue that these cases
would not be precedent for an instance of assisting the suicide of a competent person.
Alternative causes of action involving suicide include negligence (conduct causing an irre-
sistible impulse to commit suicide), intentional tort (willful causing of mental distress), and
workers' compensation (statutorily governed compensation for work-related injuries). Phy-
sician liability is, however, generally based upon the duty of reasonable care. Howell, Civil
Liability for Suicides: An Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 573.
134. See Annot., supra note 130.
135. Id at 778-82.
136. See Sharp & Crofts, Death with Dignity: The Physician's Civil Liability, 27 BAYLOR
L. REV. 86, 86 (1975).
137. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.5 (1956).
138. Id
139. See Matthew v. Ollerton, in THE REPORT OF SEVERAL CASES ARGUED AND AD-
JUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH AT WESTMINSTER; FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF
KING JAMES II, TO THE TENTH YEAR OF KING WILLIAM III, at 218 (R. Comberbach ed.
1724) (holding that one may not give another license to beat oneself).
140. Survey, Euthanasia.- Criminal Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1203, 1216-17 (1973).
141. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3.
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case of assisting a rationally chosen suicide.' 42 The study recognized this
imposition of liability to be harsh, especially in the case of an individual
with a terminal illness. The study suggests, however, that even in this cir-
cumstance civil liability should be imposed although "mitigating circum-
stances should be allowed to exercise their influence on the issue of
damages."' 143 This approach does not consider the burden of justification
placed upon those who would restrict the actions of free individuals, and
that such actions should be considered prima facie free of liability. In-
stead, the study sees these impositions as a means of solving certain social
problems, a view based upon concern for the state's paternalistic interests,
not upon concerns respecting the freedom of persons. 44
C Natural Death Acts
Ironically, Texas, after proscribing the right to aid or assist suicide,
adopted a natural death act that, as one of its goals, allows the deaths of
individuals to conform more with their wishes.145 Natural death acts have
been adopted to enable individuals to refuse life-prolonging treatment
when illness has rendered them no longer competent. The acts give the
individual a mechanism to refuse treatment when in a terminal state,
through specific instructions against particular forms of treatment given
prior to incompetence, or through the appointment of another to decide
whether treatment should be refused.' 46 A number of states, including
Texas, 147 have followed California's example in allowing treatment refusal
only when the individual is in a terminal state, the declaration being effec-
tive only after the individual has been in a terminal state for at least four-
teen days. 148 Under such a statute, an individual who has had a number of
142. Schwartz, supra note 3.
143. Id at 222.
144. Id at 255.
145. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1982).
146. See Garland, The Right to Die in California-Politis, Legislators and Natural
Death, 6 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 5 (1976); Orbon, The "Living Will"--An Individual's Exer-
cise of His Rights of Privacy and Self-Determination, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 714 (1976). Right to
die bills and statutes can be arranged in three groups, depending on the authority they use to
allow treatment refusal. The first group allows a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment
when terminally ill; the second group allows refusal of treatment as such, and the last group
authorizes physicians or others to make treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent pa-
tients. An excellent example of the first group is the California Natural Death Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1982). A number of unpassed state
bills fall into the second category, e.g., H.R. 897, 1976 Alabama. An example of the third
type of proposal is found in New Mexico's code, which allows the patient's family to execute
a decision on behalf of an incompetent patient. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1981). There
have been proposals as well to shift authority to the attending physician. H.R. 662, 158 Leg.
1st Sess., 1976 Virginia.
147. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1982).
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1982). The following states pat-
terned their statutes after California in their laws on natural death by requiring that the
patient be in a terminal state: IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-28,101 (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 to
-323 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050-.090 (1981); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h
(Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1982).
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heart attacks, for example, likely cannot establish an instrument that will
prevent resuscitation after being apneic for over five minutes, even though
serious but not fatal brain damage will occur, unless the individual was
already suffering from terminal heart disease prior to executing the direc-
tive.149 One cannot prevent being resuscitated only to survive in a vegeta-
tive state, although one's prior wishes may still prove influential. Other
state statutes, however, provide a broader power for individuals to refuse
life-saving treatment.1 0
The recent decisions and statutes supporting a right to refuse life-saving
treatment suggest that our laws should not follow the traditional English
view of preserving life because it is held to be owned by the Crown or by
God, or because of the moral disapproval of some citizens. 151 Rather, our
149. Ironically, Texas, which historically has respected the liberty of its citizens to take
their own lives, does not recognize the right to refuse life-saving treatment under such
clearly definable circumstances as neocortical death. Neocortical death follows a prolonged
cardiac arrest and results in the consequential loss of all hope of future sapience, but does
not qualify as brain damage.
150. For a recent summary of statutes allowing the refusal of life-saving treatment, see
Capron, Death and the Law.- A Decade of Change, 63 SOUNDINGS 290, 306 (1980). As
Capron indicates, although Texas and California require 14-day waiting periods, Idaho and
Nevada do not require a waiting period, and Nevada does not require imminence of death.
Arkansas allows others to execute a directive for an incompetent patient, and New Mexico
allows a third party to execute a directive for a terminally ill minor. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 82-3801 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4502 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.600 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3
(1978); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1982). These statutes, as well
as the final Quinlan decision, suggest quite reasonably that life has no intrinsic value, but
rather an instrumental value, primarily for the person who is living it. Life is good only if,
and insofar as, it produces a good for the person living it. Moreover, the person living that
life should be the judge of the life's relative worth. This view involves a shift from the
metaphysical appreciation of the value of life to one grounded in the recognition of and
respect for free individuals as the determiners of the significance of their own lives. It in-
volves as well a shift from the view that God or society owns the lives of individuals to the
view that individuals are the owners of their own lives, in the sense that they have prima
facie authority over the disposition of their lives.
151. One might consider the justification for the state's preventing citizens from perform-
ing an act that does not directly harm but only offends those citizens. Only recently have we
as a civilization agreed to protect those who disturb others by their worship of God in ways
that offend those of different religious persuasion. Thus, on the one hand the law forbids
religious worship as a compulsory element of existing in society, while on the other hand
forms of religious worship, or the absence thereof, that may offend others and occasion
moral outrage, are protected. One has the right to legal protection in the pursuit of religious
goals that may be highly offensive to public morals, for example, a Satan cult.
Laws are still tolerated, however, that allow the state to use force against individuals
merely because of the moral outrage that their private act occasions. Virginia deems it a
felony for married couples to have oral intercourse, even in private. VA. CODE § 18.2-361
(1982). In short, the law is used to impose forcibly the opinions of some upon others. For
this reason basic rights exist in democracies in order to limit the scope of majoritarian deci-
sions. Thus, the first State Constitution of Texas made its bill of basic rights beyond
majoritarian alteration, unlike the federal Constitution, which allows for alteration of the
Constitution upon two-thirds approval of the Congress and three-fourths of the states, that
is, by repeal of the first amendment. The Texas Bill of Rights stated: "To guard against
transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this 'Bill of
Rights' is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain invio-
late .... " TEX. CONST. art. I, § 21 (1845).
The determination of one's own life, including suicide and assisting suicide, is a private
matter and should not be interfered with simply because it occasions public moral outrage.
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laws have taken an increasingly libertarian view with regard to refusing
life-saving treatment, a view more consistent with the maxim that in-
nocents should not be forced to live without their consent.
The suggestion has been made that the right to refuse treatment should
include the right of rational individuals dying of an attempted suicide to
refuse life-saving treatment:
If the patient demonstrates the requisite state of mind, however, and
persists in refusal of treatment, that decision [to refuse treatment]
should be respected though tantamount to suicide. The distinction
between principled and unprincipled action is not strong enough to
warrant a different approach toward the suicide-patient than that
taken toward the religiously motivated patient when both in reality
are asserting rights to bodily integrity, personal privacy, and self-de-
termination. This position, that the patient wishing to die should be
permitted to decline treatment, has distinct implications for legal ap-
proaches to suicide generally. In effect, it means that the "'serious sui-
cide, " the person whose decision to die is clearly competent, deliberate,
andfirm, should be permitted to die. The form of self-destruction, re-
fusal of treatment versus slashing of wrists or whatever, should not
matter.152
In order to realize this goal of allowing rational individuals to refuse life-
saving treatment and of protecting the right of rational suicides to com-
plete their suicidal acts, legal changes would be required in many jurisdic-
tions. As one scholar has argued: "In the future, states which desire to
legalize euthanasia not only must release physicians from homicide liabil-
ity, but also from liability extending from criminal suicide-aiding laws, in
order to avoid a catastrophic conflict."' 5 3 With these statutory changes,
individuals could successfully commit suicide based upon the maxim of
not forcing the innocent to live against their wishes.
Under old Texas case law, which refused to impose liability for suicide,
attempted suicide, or assisted suicide, this maxim could be rephrased: One
ought to protect innocent citizens from others interfering in their own life
and death decisions. The change in formulation underscores the difference
between valuing life in the abstract to respecting the freedom of persons
and their right to decide when and under what circumstances their lives
have meaning. Under present Texas law this right is acknowledged by
allowing anyone, especially the terminally ill, to commit suicide without
legal interference. By again recognizing the ancillary right in Texas to so-
licit aid in suicide and securing competent suicides and their aiders against
Such interference would involve the use of public force by some members of the community
against other members of the community. The line between proper public activities, for
example, protection against unconsented violence, enforcement of contracts, and commonly
chosen enterprises of public welfare, and the private sphere must in each case be drawn with
care. The right to engage in suicide or to have one's suicide abetted as a private, consensual
activity should thus not extend to the right to commit suicide in a public place without the
consent of those who might be forced to be onlookers, nor on the property of others without
their consent.
152. Cantor, supra note 3, at 258 (emphasis added).
153. Comment, Criminal Aspects, supra note 3, at 163.
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liability, Texas would round out its interest in the right of individuals to
rule their own lives, an interest reflected in its natural death act.
IV. FUTURE LEGAL RESPONSES
Having examined the development of the law's view of aiding and abet-
ting suicide, the issue arises concerning what the law should be in these
matters. For seventy-one years Texas permitted passive facilitation of sui-
cide without untoward consequences. As for the state's current attitude, it
is questionable to what extent Texas retains Blackstone's avowed interest
of the King in preserving his subjects, or to what extent the state can be
justified in imposing particular moral views on others.154 As to the King's
interest, the issue is troublesome for those who would defend laws against
suicide in light of current levels of unemployment and potential overpopu-
lation. At best, such considerations might establish a state interest in the
preservation of particularly highly trained or talented subjects. This view,
however, is incompatible with the tradition of individual liberties and
rights of citizens developed in Texas. In any event, Americans have been
reluctant to view themselves analogously as subjects of a king. Insofar as
America constitutes a community bound together in terms of mutual re-
spect of freedom, rather than in regard for coercion, its members cannot be
viewed as subjects of the state or subject to the state's enforced morality.
Neither is it clear that current members of any community wish the state to
act paternalistically by deciding what is in their best interests, rather than
by allowing them that choice, especially when the issue is as important as
the termination of their own lives. If ever there be a right one would wish
to reserve for oneself, it would appear to be this.
As the history of their law shows, Texans have reserved the right to
choose the moment of their own deaths. Once one acknowledges the obli-
gation to respect self-determination, concurring with the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in its refusal to proscribe aiding and abetting suicide is
easy. The fact that an absence of laws against suicide and assisting suicide
did not lead to a significant number of recognized cases of self-inflicted
harm or to an erosion of Texas's interests in preserving society, indicates
that no justification for such laws exists. From the Grace v. State ruling in
1902 to the Texas adoption of the Model Penal Code in 1973 and its pro-
scription of assisted suicide, no record of suicide abuse in Texas was estab-
lished. Whatever cases of aiding and abetting suicide did occur likely took
place in reasonable circumstances, not indicative of abuse nor with antiso-
cial consequences.155 In particular, an insignificant number of individuals
appear to have enlisted the aid of others in the commission of their sui-
154. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 189.
155. A comparison of suicide rates in Texas fails to show, for example, any beneficial
impact of the new law forbidding assisted suicide. The rate of suicide per 100,000 was 10.5
in 1969, 11.5 in 1970, 11.4 in 1971, 12.3 in 1972, 11.6 in 1973, 12.6 in 1974, 13.5 in 1975, 12.1
in 1976, and 14.0 in 1977. Compare further Texas's rates with those of its immediate
neighbors:
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cides. The seventy-one years of Texas's respect for the autonomy and self-
determination of individuals did not lead to social disruptions.
One thus has a sociological and anthropological experiment of seventy-
one years duration showing that the absence of a law proscribing aiding
and abetting suicide does not have antisocial effects. Patients may be com-
forted simply to know that they are not being forced to live, although few
would avail themselves of a more speedy death. Freedom is often valued
in itself. Given the value we find in this freedom, indeed, given that re-
spect of freedom is a condition for a community founded on mutual re-
spect rather than force, the state should not intrude upon that freedom and
proscribe victimless actions. Already established procedures for commit-
ment 56 ind for the right of physicians in ambiguous circumstances to act
to preserve life157 should suffice to protect the mentally infirm. That laws
Suicides per 100,000:
Oklahoma Arizona Louisiana Texas
1970 9.6 14.7 9.3 11.5
1971 10.4 18.5 9.1 11.4
1972 12.3 17.1 10.7 12.3
1973 13.5 16.1 10.5 11.6
1974 18.8 18.4 10.9 12.6
1975 14.2 17.6 11.9 13.5
1976 12.6 17.3 11.3 12.1
2 U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1969, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, MORTALITY part B, tables 7-7, 7-483 (for number of
suicides 1969-75); Texas Center for Health Statistics, Statistical Services, Austin, Texas (for
the number of suicides in Texas 1976-77); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, Se-
ries P-25, No. 727, at 7, table 2: "Annual Estimates of the Resident Populations of States
1970-1977" (July 1978).
156. Texas law provides for emergency admission to a mental hospital or a general hos-
pital if a "person is mentally ill and because of his mental illness is likely to cause injury to
himself." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-27 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
One commentator has argued that:
In light of a recent United States Supreme Court case, holding that effective
treatment must be offered an involuntary mental patient in a state hospital or
the patient must be released, unless he is dangerous to others, it seems a pa-
tient who has attempted suicide but shows no present suicidal threats should
be released. If a patient really desires to kill himself, it is doubtful he can be
halted, even in a mental hospital. Without effective treatment for those who
attempt suicide, a mental hospital would be :aard-pressed to justify holding a
patient against his will.
Comment, CriminalAspects, supra note 3, at 161 (footnote omitted).
157. Physicians are generally empowered to act to preserve life in emergency situations
unless they have been clearly requested from an obviously competent patient to stop further
life-saving treatment. The absence of a proscription against aiding and abetting suicide
would not impede physicians from giving emergen.-y treatment to suicides as they always
have, presuming the suicide's incompetency and absent a competently executed living will
applying to the situation of attempted suicide. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5547-27 (Vernon Supp. 1982). For a more explicit discussion of a physician's powers in
emergency situations, see In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973). One must note as well
the danger of taking away under the guise of incompetency the rights to suicide and assisted
suicide. Criteria for finding incompetency in order to allow treatment of a would-be or
attempted suicide must be set with care, though these criteria will necessarily be more lax in
emergency situations when less time is available to assess competency or to assess whether
an attempted suicide was the act of a rational individual. Once it becomes clear, however,
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against suicide or against aiding and abetting suicide afford significant ad-
ditional protection is unlikely. Insofar as one seriously respects freedom as
a condition for a moral community, the onus of proof lies upon those wish-
ing to declare others incompetent simply in order to forbid suicide, or for-
bid suicide assistance, to prevent a victimless crime.
Texas, by adopting the Model Penal Code's proscription of aiding and
abetting suicide, acted both against its traditions of individual liberty and
against the increasingly appreciated propriety of allowing individual deci-
sions concerning the circumstances of death. Texas should correct that er-
ror and return to a stance consistent with its traditional nonproscription of
suicide, a stance in accord with its previous proper refusal to legally pro-
scribe passively assisted suicide. This legal position would be a model for
other states in their attempt to return life and death decisions to the hands
of those most concerned, those who would die.
In addition to lifting sanctions against suicide and attempted suicide,
Texas and other jurisdictions should adopt statutes stating that it is lawful
for an individual to furnish another competent individual with the means
to commit suicide, as long as the person committing suicide takes the last
definite step to initiate the suicidal act. Thus, a physician or anyone else
could make available to an individual the means by which to commit sui-
cide; however, the person committing suicide would have to perform the
last act. Competence of the person committing suicide in the absence of
coercion would need to be recognized as a defense against civil liability for
those who assist suicide. A mandatory formal declaration before witnesses
prior to an assisted suicide might also be considered as a precaution
against foul play masquerading as an assisted suicide.
This Article thus concludes that suicide and aiding and abetting suicide
should be statutorily defined as noncriminal, just as the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals similarly held in 1902 and 1908. The purpose would be
to withdraw state intrusion from an area in which experience has shown no
need for intrusion and the private nature of the issues involved is such that
they should be left to those most concerned with them, the principals
themselves. In allowing rational individuals to commit suicide and to be
aided in their suicide without fear of liability, those individuals are
respected as capable decision-makers shaping their own destinies.
that a suicide was rationally attempted, even emergency treatment should not be imposed.
For an exploration of some of the difficulties involved in determining competency, see
MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (B. Brody & H. Engelhardt eds. 1980).
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